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Abstract
Background: Gaps remain in understanding how performance-based incentive (PBI) programs affect quality of care
and service quantity, whether programs are cost effective and how programs could be tailored to meet client and
provider needs while remaining operationally viable. In 2014, Malawi’s Ministry of Health launched the Service Delivery
Integration-PBI (SSDI-PBI) program. The program is unique in that no portion of performance bonuses are paid to
individual health workers, and it shifts responsibility for infrastructure and equipment procurement from facility staff to
implementing partners. This protocol outlines an approach that analyzes processes and outcomes, considers expected
and unexpected consequences of the program and frames the program’s outputs relative to its costs. Findings from
this evaluation will inform the intended future scale-up of PBI in Malawi.
Methods/design: This study employs a prospective controlled before-and-after triangulation design to assess effects
of the PBI program by analyzing quantitative and qualitative data from intervention and control facilities. Guided by a
theoretical framework, the evaluation consists of four main components: service provision, health worker motivation,
implementation processes and costing. Quality and access outcomes are assessed along four dimensions: (1) structural
elements (related to equipment, drugs, staff); (2) process elements (providers’ compliance with standards); (3) outputs
(service utilization); (4) experiential elements (experiences of service delivery). The costing component includes costs
related to start-up, ongoing management, and the cost of incentives themselves. The cost analysis considers
costs incurred within the Ministry of Health, funders, and the implementing agency. The evaluation relies on
primary data (including interviews and surveys) and secondary data (including costing and health management
information system data).
Discussion: Through the lens of a PBI program, we illustrate how complex interventions can be evaluated via not
only primary, mixed-methods data collection, but also through a wealth of secondary data from program implementers
(including monitoring, evaluation and financial data), and the health system (including service utilization and service
readiness data). We also highlight the importance of crafting a theory and using theory to inform the nature of data
collected. Finally, we highlight the need to be responsive to stakeholders in order to enhance a study’s relevance.
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Background
Performance-based incentives
Performance-based incentives (PBI) refer to a range of
health system interventions that provide financial re-
wards based on the attainment and verification of prede-
fined quantity and/or quality outputs [1–3]. As such, the
approach represents a seismic shift in how health sys-
tems operate. Traditionally, facilities have been funded
based on historical precedent or on metrics such as
staffing levels, number of beds or the total population of
the catchment area [4]. Performance-based approaches
link incentives to desired outputs, thereby attempting to
spark an entrepreneurial, autonomous spirit among pro-
viders. In the past 10 years, performance-based pro-
grams have proliferated across sub-Saharan Africa (SSA);
as of 2013 at least three countries have national programs
and 17 were conducting ongoing pilots [1]. A landscape
analysis of programs that were initiated between 2008 and
2015 identified 32 programs across low and middle in-
come countries (LMICs), including 25 programs across 21
countries in SSA specifically [5].
Initial evidence from pilots in low-income, SSA countries
suggests that linking payment mechanisms to defined out-
puts can lead to increased service coverage and improved
service quality. In Rwanda, results from two independent
evaluations showed a positive impact of PBI on utilization
for institutional deliveries, growth-monitoring consulta-
tions, and increased levels of perceived and technical
quality of care (defined as compliance with national and
international norms) [6, 7]. In the Democratic Republic of
Congo, providing performance-based subsidies resulted in
lower direct payments to health facilities for patients, who
received comparable or higher quality services than pa-
tients receiving care in control facilities as measured
via responses regarding patients’ overarching percep-
tions of quality, drug availability and respectful care to-
ward patients by staff [8]. Despite these promising
findings, a 2012 Cochrane review concluded that the
existing evidence base is too thin to draw conclusions
on the effects of performance-based interventions on
the provision of health care and on health outcomes
(whether related to treatment or prevention for mater-
nal or child health) in LMICs [4].
While supporters of PBI claim that the approach can
catalyze reforms and address structural problems of
health services (including inefficiency and inequity) [9],
reservations regarding PBI remain [4]. Three main criti-
cisms include [10]: (1.) introducing financial incentives
into a working environment characterized by a high de-
gree of idealism may erode health workers’ intrinsic mo-
tivation (“crowding out”) [11]; (2.) the fact that PBI only
addresses a limited range of indicators could lead to a
neglect of non-remunerated aspects of work in favor of
those that are remunerated (“gaming”) [12]; and (3.)
there are considerable costs associated with implement-
ing and monitoring PBI schemes [13].
Substantial knowledge gaps remain within the existing
performance-based literature. In terms of program impact,
there is a lack of research on intended and unintended
consequences of such programs, limited understandings
of patient and provider satisfaction with programs, and in-
sufficient analysis of how PBI programming affects equity,
resource use, organizational change and provider motiv-
ation [4]. Questions also remain as to how individual com-
ponents of PBI schemes, both jointly and independently,
affect quality of care outcomes [4, 14, 15]. In terms of pro-
gram design, no evidence exists as to whether rewards not
directly redistributed to health workers, but targeting ex-
clusively facility improvements could result in increased
access to quality services. In terms of program cost, lim-
ited evidence exists as to whether PBI schemes represent
good value for money; we are aware of just one study that
presents the costs of setting up and implementing a pay-
for-performance program in a low-income context [16].
Finally, in terms of evaluation design, there is limited re-
search that examines a PBI program in a holistic sense, by
integrating elements of process, impact, and cost while
relying on not only primary data, but also existing (sec-
ondary) data.
Our protocol represents an attempt to fill some of
these knowledge and methodological gaps, by combining
in a single study an assessment of the effects of a PBI
program with an analysis of its implementation pro-
cesses and with an economic evaluation, geared towards
understanding PBI “value for money”. Our protocol is
being implemented in Malawi external to the implemen-
tation of the SSDI-PBI program [17].
Study setting
Malawi suffers from a heavy burden of HIV and com-
municable diseases (especially TB and Malaria) and,
more recently, increases in non-communicable diseases
(hypertension, diabetes and cancer) [18]. While the
country has met several of its Millennium Development
Goals (MDG) targets including those related to child
mortality (MDG 4) and HIV and AIDS (MDG 6), other
targets were not met including those related to mater-
nal mortality (MDG 5) [19]. High rates of morbidity
and mortality – particularly maternal mortality – have
been linked to shortages in human resources for health,
and inadequacies within facilities related to basic and
essential infrastructure, management, support and services
[20–22]. Healthcare delivery is largely centered around
provision of an essential healthcare package (EHP) (in-
cluding reproductive health services, child health services,
as well as services related to the prevention, detection and
management of infectious and non-communicable health
problems) which is intended to be provided free of charge
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at point of use either in public facilities or in private not-
for-profit facilities contracted by the Ministry of Health
(MoH) [23]. Evidence indicates, however, that services in-
cluded in the EHP are not as effectively available as they
should be, thereby subjecting clients to substantial out-of-
pocket expenditures [24–27].
Malawi’s MoH considers PBI a potential solution to the
longstanding problem of inadequate service provision
[28]. With financial support provided by the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), the
Ministry of Health (MoH) of Malawi launched the Sup-
port for Service Delivery Integration (SSDI) Project in
2011 [29]. The objective of this initiative is to combine
efforts of local and foreign organizations in order to
strengthen the provision of EHP services [23].
Two SSDI sectors, SSDI-Systems and SSDI-Services,
designed a PBI intervention that has been implemented
in 17 facilities across three SSDI target districts (Chitipa,
Nkhotakota, Mangochi) since 2014. Facilities were se-
lected (non-randomly) based on minimum quotas related
to equipment, infrastructure and personnel as deemed ne-
cessary to guarantee adequate EHP service delivery. Most
facilities were also chosen based on their inclusion in a
larger quality improvement program called “PQI” (for Per-
formance Quality Improvement). PQI is based on the
Standards-Based Management and Recognition (SBM-R)
approach to quality improvement, which urges providers
and staff consider the root causes and attainable solutions
to address poor performance [30]. In this respect, the
SSDI-PBI program builds upon an existing intervention
that aims to improve provider performance and service
delivery [30].
The SSDI-PBI program aims to increase access,
utilization, and quality of EHP services by linking re-
wards to service utilization and quality indicators across
a range of conditions and services. Utilization, or quan-
tity, indicators focus on increasing total counts in terms
of services across the maternal health continuum of care
(during antenatal, delivery and postpartum periods),
newborn and child health, and HIV and AIDS care and
treatment (see Table 1 for a list of quantity indicators).
Quality indicators emphasize improvements in the broader
facility environment and in the nature of how care is pro-
vided across 13 service areas (see Table 2 for a list of qual-
ity dimensions). Quality assessments are complemented by
a community component wherein a series of focus groups
(a component of “community scorecards”) and exit inter-
views are conducted with clients to gauge satisfaction.
SSDI-PBI rewards are comprised primarily of quantity and
quality scores, with community scores serving as a source
of potential bonus payments. Rewards are paid to facilities
upon achievement of set targets, but the rewards can only
be used toward facility improvements and cannot be par-
tially redistributed in the form of performance bonuses to
individual health workers, which is common under other
performance-based schemes. Another defining characteris-
tic of the rewarding system is that procurement at the
facility level is managed through existing SSDI finance and
procurement structures rather than through facility-based
personnel. Rewarded funds are invested in previously de-
termined service improvement activities or strategies
outlined in annual business plans, which are developed
by facility staff in collaboration with SSDI staff. These
plans outline the activities, procurements or technical
support that facility staff intend to prioritize as a means
to improve care.
Table 1 Quantity Indicators used in SSDI-PBI
1. Number of pregnant women starting antenatal care during the first
trimester
2. Number of women completing the four antenatal care visits
3. Number of pregnant women receiving at least two doses of
intermittent preventive therapy
4. Number of births attended by skilled birth attendants (doctor,
nurse or midwife)
5. Number of 1-year-old children fully immunized
6. Number of HIV-positive pregnant women who were initiated on
antiretroviral therapy
7. Number of HIV/AIDS cases screened for Tuberculosis
8. Number of children receiving Vitamin A supplementation
9. Number of clients counseled for family planning
10. Number of couples tested for HIV during HIV testing and counseling
services
11. Number of infants born by HIV positive mothers tested for HIV
12. Number of women who receive postnatal care after delivery by
skilled health workers within seven days
13. Number of pregnant women attending antenatal care receiving
iron supplementation
Table 2 Quality Dimensions assessed in SSDI-PBI
1. General activities
2. Follow-up assessment and HMIS
3. Hygiene, environment, and sterilization
4. Outpatient and inpatient consultation
5. Maternity ward
6. Antenatal consultation
7. Family planning
8. Vaccination and monitoring of newborns
9. HIV/AIDS control
10. Tuberculosis
11. Laboratory
12. Minor surgery
13. Drug and commodity management
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Study objective and theoretical model
The SSDI-PBI intervention is designed to influence the
quantity and quality of service delivery, through the
provision of incentives tied to facility performance and
earmarked for reinvestment in facility infrastructure and
equipment as outlined in facility-specific business plans.
The SSDI-PBI intervention is therefore different from
most PBI interventions implemented elsewhere in SSA
in at least two fundamental respects [1, 31]. First, SSDI-
PBI does not permit the provision of financial incentives
in the form of salary top-ups or cash bonuses to individ-
ual health workers and/or service provider teams, thus it
cannot be expected to directly increase health workers’
motivation (and, as a consequence, quality of health
service provision) through increased remuneration. Fur-
thermore, since the process of procuring goods, supplies
and equipment acquired via PBI is managed largely by
SSDI, facility or health worker-level autonomy in terms
of acquiring additional resources appears to be restricted
relative to other PBI schemes [1, 31].
Theoretical model guiding this research
Despite the aforementioned factors, which could limit the
effects of the intervention on health worker motivation
and autonomy, it is plausible that additional funds gener-
ated by this PBI intervention could lead to increases in
utilization and improvements in the quality of services via
upgrades to both the physical and psychosocial working
environment (in the form of structural improvements, the
purchase and maintenance of currently lacking medical
equipment and supplies). It also possible that the exist-
ence of the program could provide an opportunity – al-
beit with an element of pressure – for facility staff to
better organize and outline their processes, to clarify
performance and supervision expectations, and ultim-
ately to galvanize one another in order to attain targets.
Given that system weaknesses have often been linked to
inadequate supplies [24–27], these improvements should
almost inevitably result in better opportunities to provide
clinical care. In turn, improved psycho-social working
conditions are expected to enhance not only job satisfac-
tion among health workers but also their motivation to
enact clinical practices according to expected standards,
thereby leading to improvements in the overall quality of
care delivered. The positive relationship fostered by im-
provements in the working environment, in health worker
satisfaction and motivation, and in health worker practices
is likely to ultimately lead to higher client satisfaction,
which could serve to further reinforce the working envir-
onment and health workers’ clinical and interpersonal
performance.
The prevailing theory guiding performance-based litera-
ture is called principal agent theory [4]. The theory states
that due to knowledge asymmetries that are inherent to
the health encounter, it is necessary to devise novel strat-
egies that align the goals and expectations of those who
are principals (such as Ministries of Health) with the goals
and expectations of agents (such as providers). Much like
performance-based approaches, the theory urges that this
bridging of goals can best happen via the alignment of re-
wards with targets [4, 32]. In other words, if an imple-
menter or an institution (such as a Ministry of Health)
makes its expectations more explicit by attaching a price
to each service target, providers will adjust their behavior
to respond to such a price signal.
While we appreciate the importance of goal setting
and remuneration as a means to understand how and
through which mechanisms PBI programs compel
change, we find merit in expanding this view to con-
sider the health encounter – and the environment
within which health encounters occur – more broadly.
To guide our conceptualization of the ways in which
PBI interacts with the practices and routines of life in
health facilities (with a particular influence on providers),
we drew upon Social Cognitive Theory, a psychological
model of behavior [33]. The theory highlights three key
domains (“the triad”) that influence change: personal fac-
tors of an individual such as one’s sense of self-efficacy;
behavioral factors in terms of an individual’s ability and
experience enacting a set of behaviors; and environmental
factors in terms of the availability of goods and supplies
necessary to create change. Focusing on these three ele-
ments and the reciprocal determinism that exists among
them, we focus our study on several facets of life in health
facilities that are influenced in the context of PBI.
We have adapted Social Cognitive Theory’s Cognition-
Behavior-Environment triad to reflect our proposed triad
of Provider’s Intrinsic Factors-Provider Practices-Working
Environment. In Fig. 1, the uppermost box is labeled
provider practices. We assert that PBI alters providers’
routines and behaviors; it can redirect certain clinical
practices (including at the expense of other practices)
and/or it can codify certain elements of clinical care (such
as filling out partographs). This shift in clinical practices
affects and is affected by providers’ internal cognition (see
lower-left box labeled Provider Intrinsic Factors) as well as
life in the broader facility (see lower-right box labeled
Working Environment). In relation to the lower-left box,
we hypothesize that PBI affects provider knowledge and
self-efficacy (via PBI’s emphasis on education, supportive
supervision and business plan coaching etc.), and that this
could improve both the working environment and clinical
practices. Finally, we argue that PBI programs lead to not
only tangible changes in the health facility but also to
changes in the social relationships and work routines in
the health facility environment, which we refer to as the
“Working Environment”. These changes could, in turn,
spark improvements in the behaviors of providers and
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foster a sense of capacity, confidence and professional
competence among individual providers. Taken as a
whole, we use the highlighted theory as a conceptual
springboard upon which to both understand the program
and to design our study.
Study objective
We are undertaking a combined impact and process evalu-
ation, with an aim to assess the effect that the SSDI-PBI
intervention produces on the work environment, on pro-
vider behavior (including service outputs) and on pro-
viders’ sense of knowledge, motivation and self-efficacy.
Via a fidelity of implementation (FOI) assessment, we in-
tend to look at intervention effects in light of contextual
factors that shaped program implementation. Finally, we
are also examining the cost of implementing the interven-
tion in relation to outcomes produced. Our research ques-
tions are as follows:
1. Focusing on service provision, to what extent has
the SSDI-PBI intervention produced changes in the
quantity and quality of services provided? Which
work environment changes can be attributed to PBI
(i.e. availability of equipment, drugs, staff, training,
supervision in respect to clinical performance)?
What heterogeneity in effects can be observed across
districts and facilities? To what extent have changes
affected incentivized vs. non-incentivized services?
2. Focusing on providers specifically, how has the
SSDI-PBI intervention changed motivation of health
workers? Are changes in motivation reflected in
changed attitudes or behavior at work?
3. Focusing on fidelity, to what extent has the SSDI-
PBI intervention been implemented according to
its original implementation plan? Which contextual
factors have affected implementation, as defined in
relation to acceptance and adoption of the inter-
vention, at the various levels of service provision,
including at health facility levels? Which contextual
factors explain heterogeneity in implementation
processes across districts and facilities?
4. Focusing on efficiency, what are the costs of
implementing the SSDI-PBI intervention in relation
to the outcomes produced? Is the economic burden
of designing, implementing and managing the SSDI-
PBI system worthwhile considering results achieved?
Methods and design
Overarching study design and methods
This study will rely on mixed-methods, applying both
quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection
and analysis (detailed in Table 3). The study will be par-
tially prospective, collecting and analyzing primary and
secondary data during the year of study implementation,
and partially retrospective, relying on secondary data
existing at the time leading up to and including the study
Fig. 1 Reciprocity and Change within Facilities in the Context of PBF
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launch. For a synopsis of methods and research questions
employed see Table 3.
Changes in facility routines and Provider’s lives
PBI’s impact on service provision and health worker
behavior
Drawing on a mixed-methods approach, this component
will focus on changes produced by the SSDI-PBI interven-
tion on quantity and quality of the health services provided
in relation to measured changes in the work environment.
Following our theoretical model, changes in physical and
psychosocial work environment are expected to positively
affect EHP service delivery. Specifically, we expect to ob-
serve changes in the quality of care of targeted services.
Quality of care measures will include measures of ser-
vice input, process, and output elements, such as the avail-
ability of functional equipment, stock-outs of essential
supplies and medicines, procurement and maintenance
procedures at both the individual service and the facility
level, human resource availability, client satisfaction with
essential service components, and service coverage.
Given our explicit ambition to work with a design closer
to implementation by building on health information that
is collected on a routine basis, most of the data used in
this study component will stem from secondary sources
(health management information system (HMIS), service
provision assessment (SPA), SSDI baseline data, as well as
SSDI monitoring and evaluation data). Additional infor-
mation collected through direct facility inventories and
health worker surveys will be used to further enrich the
data sources for this component.
This portion of the study will use mixed methods, col-
lecting the above quantitative but also qualitative data in
parallel with an aim to explore different facets of the same
research question. The quantitative component will adopt
a controlled time-series design, including controls that are
matched to be comparable in terms of facility type, zone
(or district, if feasible), distance to a main road, and PQI
intervention status. The inclusion of controls is meant to
minimize potential time-dependent biases. For all selected
indicators, we will therefore collect information going as
far back as 12–24 months prior to and 12–15 months fol-
lowing the PBI program’s start. The qualitative portion of
this component will be used to examine clients’ percep-
tion of service quality over the course of and in response
to the PBI intervention. Qualitative methods of data col-
lection will include IDIs with clients (i.e. service users)
and FGDs with community members (including those
who can convey community-held knowledge, attitudes
and practices in relation to the health facility).
Table 3 Research questions, methodological approach, data collection activity
Research question
divided by work package
Approach Data collection
(a) Data collection instrument (b) Sampling unit (c) Data content
Quantitative Qualitativea
1. Service Provision. How has the
intervention affected quality of
service provided and why?
Quant & Qual a. Structured Checklist; Data extraction lists for
(i) routine surveillance databases (HMIS) and
(ii) Service Provision Assessment (at baseline)
a. IDIa& FGDa
b. Health facility (intervention and control) b. Clients, Community members
c. Primary and Secondary data c. Primary data
2. Provider Motivation. How has
the intervention affected health
worker motivation?
Quant & Qual a. Health worker survey a. IDI
b. Health workers in intervention and control b. Health workers in intervention facilities
c. Primary and secondary data c. Primary data
3. Fidelity of Implementation.
How has the intervention aligned
with intended design, and what
factors have affected this?
Qual – a. IDI & Document Review
b. IDIs with MoH, Funders, PBI desk officers,
DHMTs, SSDI employees, health workers in
Intervention Facilities; Document Review of
implementation planning and monitoring
material
c. Primary and Secondary data
4. Costing. What are the costs of
implementing the intervention
in relation to outcomes produced?
Quant a. Data Extraction –
b. Implementer materials (SSDI costing data)
c. Secondary data
aMethods acronyms: IDI is in-depth interview, FGD is focus group discussion
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PBI’s effect on health workers’ motivation
Drawing on mixed methods, this component will focus on
health workers’ perceptions, satisfaction and motivation in
relation to the implementation of the SSDI-PBI interven-
tion. Specifically, we will assess whether and how changes
in the working environment are perceived by health
workers, and how these changes might have resulted in
changes in motivation to provide high quality and quantity
care. The qualitative approach will entail a series of IDIs
with selected health workers from selected intervention
health facilities, taking a retrospective approach of asking
them to recall their perceptions of changes that have taken
place in the implementation period, relating them to
specific aspects of the intervention, and explaining
pathways of change. We will conduct interviews only in
intervention facilities with an aim of interviewing at
least two providers per facility. We will also collect
quantitative survey data that will assess perceptions of
change in the working environment in both control and
intervention facilities.
The process evaluation component
Drawing on qualitative methods, the process evaluation
will focus on fidelity of implementation (FOI), and con-
sider adherence (defined in terms of content, schedule,
and coverage) to the original intervention model and the
contextual factors that mediated and affected adherence
[34, 35]. This analysis will explore to what extent in itinere
modifications - inevitable when concerned stakeholders
are responding to and implementing a given intervention -
hinder or enhance the effectiveness of the intervention
itself. The process evaluation component will allow us: to
delineate to what extent the SSDI-PBI intervention was
delivered as initially planned and to explore heterogeneity
in implementation processes across districts and facilities;
to understand how the various stakeholders responded to
the intervention and acted to modify, for better or for
worse, its content; to identify contextual elements that
affected the implementation of the SSDI-PBI intervention
and to what extent these elements can explain heterogen-
eity in outcomes across districts and facilities.
Within this component we will pay particular attention
to the implementation processes related to: the verification
and counter-verification system, to understand its suitabil-
ity and effectiveness within the framework of the SSDI-PBI
intervention; the facility management structures and the
interaction with the SSDI team in charge of the facility
business plans, to understand the process of receiving and
re-investing the performance rewards and the potential for
“gaming” induced by these structures; and the role that
district management teams play in relation to supervision,
human resource allocation, and distribution of equipment
and commodities, to identify potential changes in behavior
in favor of incentivized facilities and services.
This portion of the study will rely on qualitative methods,
conducted using a prospective approach. In line with stand-
ard practice in process evaluation [36] and with our own
work in similar settings [37, 38], we will begin our work by
convening a workshop with the SSDI-PBI core design and
implementation team to develop a shared Theory of Inter-
vention (TOI) and to identify the core 20–25 activities
which fit this TOI, and are key to the intervention success
from a theoretical point of view. Qualitative data will be
collected to examine contextual factors that mediated the
implementation and as such affected fidelity, and to explore
how the various stakeholders responded to the intervention
through adaptation and adoption. By “stakeholders” we are
referring to anyone involved in the design and implementa-
tion of the intervention (i.e. the funding agency and its
implementing partners, Ministry of Health (MoH) direct-
orates, district management teams, PBI desk officers, as
well as at least one health worker from each concerned fa-
cility). Sampling will be done via the snowball method
wherein the study team will first be introduced by the fund-
ing agency and key programmatic personnel to those
engaged in the SSDI-PBI program. This will assist the re-
search team in identifying initial respondents. These re-
spondents will be asked to assist in the identification of
other respondents, who could facilitate an understanding of
the themes and issues raised in the interview or related to
the program generally.
The costing component
The main objective of this component is to evaluate costs
of the SSDI-PBI scheme to provide insights on the value
for money associated with the intervention. The costs
associated with PBI include the following cost categories:
a.) start-up costs (design of program, training, initial dis-
semination); b.) ongoing management (including verifica-
tion and counter-verification); c.) the cost of incentives
themselves. These costs are incurred at the level of the
Ministry of Health, its development partners (USAID), and
the implementing agency (SSDI). The cost analysis will
allow estimating the incidence of different cost categories,
accruing the total costs of PBI. More specifically, we will be
able to compare the total costs of start-up, implementation
and management of the PBI scheme to the costs of finan-
cial incentives. For the majority of cost components, costs
will be evaluated using the micro-costing approach, which
requires that for each cost category, quantity of resources is
identified and then multiplied by its unit costs. To do this
we will rely heavily on support from the implementation
team, asking to access their financial and cost management
data. We will also request lists of participants who were en-
gaged in key implementation activities (and approximate
salary ranges across cadres of employment) in order to ac-
count for an allocation of staff time toward PBI activities in
the event that time investment was not paid for.
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Overarching analysis & data protection
The ultimate aim of this research is to assess the effect that
the SSDI-PBI intervention produces on the quantity and
quality of care in light of the intervention implementation
processes and at what cost. While the work is divided into
components to ease data collection and analysis, the ultim-
ate aim of this study is to triangulate and integrate infor-
mation across components and data sources in order to
address the overall study objective, and to provide a more
nuanced interpretive analysis. Lead researchers across
study components will convene to discuss and share find-
ings upon completion of analysis of a given component.
Quantitative data analysis
Quantitative data will be analyzed using Stata. Our analyt-
ical approach will largely rely on a controlled time-series
analysis, building on data from 17 intervention and 17
control facilities. As such, the actual sample size will be
34. For each of the quantitative outcome indicators, we
will include monthly data from the HMIS for the period
Sept 2013 to Dec 2015 (or 12–24 months prior to and
12–15 months following PBI start). This will generate a
total of 28 observation points for each of the 34 facilities
included in the study. For each service provision indicator,
we will compare developments over time across interven-
tion and control facilities. Given that we could not assess
actual data availability and completeness prior to data
collection, we will do ex-post power calculations. We will
assess the impact of the intervention on targeted service
provision indicators using an interrupted time-series
model with independent controls. In addition, given the
availability of two single time points, we will rely on differ-
ence in differences modeling to assess changes in quality
of care, using for example changes in staff numbers and
qualification, availability of equipment and supply as prox-
ies. This analytical component will draw upon primary
data that will be collected in intervention and control fa-
cilities, as well as SPA data collected in January 2014,
which will serve as a pseudo-baseline.
Qualitative data analysis
All qualitative interviews will be tape-recorded, tran-
scribed and translated into English. Qualitative data will
be analyzed using a hybrid approach. We will first iden-
tify themes from a selection of rich and nuanced tran-
scripts – an inductive approach [39]. We will later apply
this template of codes to the remaining transcripts
through a deductive approach [40]. We will adopt in-
vivo coding (using NVivo 10), with codes, categories,
and themes emerging as we proceed through the data,
although the initial coding process will be guided by
the research questions. We will apply data triangulation
as we will compare information across data sources to
capture multiple perspectives of the same research
question, and analyst triangulation as at least two re-
searchers will code and interpret each set of data.
Discussion
PBI programs are complex and questions remain in terms
of the potential for such programs to improve the quality of
care and spark reductions in morbidity and mortality. The
aim of SSDI-PBI in Malawi is to increase service utilization
and stimulate better quality of care by linking payments to
strategies aimed at improving providers’ working envi-
ronments and in doing so, empowering providers with
the means to provide care of an adequate standard.
The overarching purpose of this study is to contribute
robust evidence to a growing body of literature examin-
ing the process, impact and cost-effectiveness of PBI
programs in SSA. We also aim to generate knowledge
regarding how programs such as SSDI-PBI are woven
into the health system, how they are perceived by pa-
tients and providers alike, and to what extent they are
cost-effective. We view this research as particularly use-
ful because it examines a non-conventional PBI model,
which does not entail monetary incentives or financial
autonomy at the facility level. Such a model has not
been studied in the literature.
This study design was conceptualized with a relatively
small budget and a relatively short study period (approxi-
mately one year) to rapidly meet the need of informing
the implementation of the intervention. Given the broad
scope of the PBI intervention in respect to the range of
services being incentivized, time and funding constraints
do not allow for a detailed assessment of cost, nor is it
feasible to undertake time or labor intensive endeavors
such as community-based household surveys to assess
health-seeking behavior, or direct observations to assess
quality of care processes. In respect to producing robust
effect measures, the main limitation of this study design is
that it had to be adapted to a non-randomized interven-
tion. Given that study districts and intervention facilities
were chosen by the MoH based on political and logistical
considerations rather than a random selection of health
facilities and districts, selection bias was introduced. Fur-
thermore, our study sample is limited to the relatively
small scope of the intervention (17 health facilities), po-
tentially resulting in low statistical power. As a conse-
quence, we might not be able to demonstrate statistical
significance of observed impacts. Finally, the fact that the
start of the PBI program is not aligned with the external
evaluation research further restricted the design, as base-
line information on the performance of essential health
service provision could not be based on primary data
collection on sets of indicators directly linked to spe-
cific outcome measures. As a result, different quasi-
and non-experimental study approaches and a heavy
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reliance on secondary data sources was required to ad-
dress potential threats to validity.
In terms of contending with the aforementioned limit-
ations, our evaluation team seeks to be nimble and re-
sourceful. We are drawing from multiple methods within
both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Quantita-
tively, we collect primary data related to infrastructure and
equipment, staff numbers and trainings, as well as health
worker perceptions. Qualitatively, we directly collect IDI
and FGD data across a broad range of respondents at facil-
ity, community and policymaker levels thereby inhibiting
the domination of one single respondent type. We are also
undertaking triangulation to identify points of convergence
and divergence in the data. This study draws upon a sub-
stantial amount of secondary data. The utilization of
secondary data, while imperfect, can present a means to
capitalize on existing data thereby reducing costs while
contending with time constraints. Furthermore, secondary
data presents a means to overcome the absence of an
evaluator-initiated baseline survey, to capture trends over
time (in the case of HMIS data, specifically), and to fulfill a
tenet of meaningful implementation research [41]. While
having a short turnaround period poses limitations in
terms of research, we also view it as an opportunity to gen-
erate knowledge and to inform implementation partners in
a timely fashion—even as decisions are being made regard-
ing how to expand an intervention.
This study also seeks to draw upon a theory as a means
to inform the nature of the research and to guide the
research team in terms of sampling and data analysis. We
view the development of theory as an essential though
under-emphasized concept within PBI literature. This
evaluation places an emphasis on the health facility (inclu-
sive of the staff, infrastructure and equipment therein),
which the study team and implementing team have deter-
mined represents a meaningful starting point for an exam-
ination of PBI (given the manner in which the program
compels tremendous shifts in terms of how, when, how
often and at what cost providers are capable and expected
to provide care). Furthermore, the actions of providers
and the nature and quality of their engagement with pa-
tients are critical factors in determining whether and to
what degree morbidity and mortality are ultimately re-
duced. While our theory emphasizes the effect of PBI
within the health facility, we see several points of entry to
inform future consideration of the theoretical under-
pinnings of PBI. For example, PBI lays the foundation
for national level policies and priorities that ultimately
redirect practices at zonal, regional, district and com-
munity levels. On an interpersonal level, PBI affects
how patients and providers interact with and perceive
one another (and possibly how the parties perceive
the health system more generally). Given the web of
entry points wherein one could consider theoretical
underpinnings of PBI, it is challenging to focus on a par-
ticular sphere or set of indicators, but we view an expan-
sion of theory-driven research as necessary in guiding
future research in this field.
Our study design contributes to the evaluation litera-
ture by providing an example of how sound implemen-
tation research can be done despite time and budget
constraints as well as constraints due to the size of the
intervention. We view this contribution as crucial par-
ticularly as PBI programs continue to expand and minis-
tries of health and finance – as well as funders and
program implementers – are faced with decisions re-
garding whether or how programs should be adapted or
expanded and at what cost. We view a more well-
rounded examination as a powerful tool in not only
guiding programmatic and policymaker decisions, but
also as a means to guide fellow researchers as they con-
sider how to evaluate health programs in a comprehen-
sive, affordable, meaningful and timely manner.
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